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RECENT DECISIONS
Evidence-Admissibility of Radar Speedmeter Readings-The
defendant was charged with exceeding the speed limit while operating
a bus on the New Jersey Turnpike. The apprehension of the defendant
was effected through the use of a radar speedmeter.' The State offered
evidence of the accuracy and fitness of the speedmeter for use in detect-
ing speed of moving vehicles by an electrical engineer, qualified as an
expert. The State then offered evidence of the radar speedmeter read-
ings to prove the speed of the bus at the time of the violation. Convicted
on this evidence, the defendant appealed on the grounds that the court
had permitted testimony to be given on the accuracy of this device by
one not qualified as an expert, and further that the court had permitted
hearsay testimony to be given by the officers who tested the accuracy of
the radar device before the arrest. Held: Affirmed. The qualifications
of the expert witness were sufficient to permit his testimony as to the
operation and the accuracy of the radar speedmeter. The use of radio
communication by the officers testing the device was merely incidental,
and did not make their testimony relating to the tests hearsay, where
each officer testified to independent facts not relying upon information
relayed to each other over the two-way police radio.2 State v. Dantonio,
31 N.J. Super. 105, 105 A.2d 918 (1954).
A prior New York decision held the testimony of the officers relat-
ing to the test of the radar device, in an attempt to show the accuracy
of the device at the time of arrest, to be hearsay. There the court said:
"It seems clear when Officer Kelly testified that the reading on
the dial in the radar car corresponded to the reading of the
1 The radar equipment used in the apprehension of speeders consists of a black
box called the transmitter placed on the police car facing the approaching
traffic. The transmitter casts out a cone shaped beam on the road several
hundred feet behind the police car. The distance at which this beam will ac-
curately reflect off an approaching vehicle and return the frequency or wave to
the receiving antenna depends on the height at which the transmitter is placed
from the ground and the angle at which it is placed to the road. The reflected
frequency is converted to miles per hour in the radar speedmeter and the
meter needle registers the speed of the vehicle.
Two police cars are used in the operation, one with the radar device setup
parked along the road called the "radar car" and the other car parked about
one-quarter to one-half mile up the road called the "pickup car."
The officer in the radar car watches the meter in his car while passing vehicles
go through the beam; and when a violation of the speed limit is committed, the
officer notes the color, model and license number of the car and radios this
description ahead to the pickup car. The pickup officer, during daylight hours,
flags down the offender and issues a summons. At night several pickup cars
park close to the radar car; and when an offender's license number is given to
them over the radio, they pursue the speeder and issue a summons.
2To test the accuracy of the radar equipment before using it to apprehend
speeders, one officer drives his car through the beam while maintaining two-
way radio contact with the officer in the radar car. This officer relays his speed
as indicated by his speedometer, when he is approaching and passing through
the radar beam, to the officer in the radar car. The officer in the radar car by
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speedometer in the pickup car, he was relying upon what Officer
Chaplin had told him over the radio; and when Officer Chaplin
testified that the reading on the dial in the radar car corre-
sponded with the reading on the speedometer of the pickup car,
he was relying on what Officer Kelly told him over the radio.
There, the testimony of each as to the reading on the instrument
of the other was hearsay ... the trial court erred in receiving
their testimony over objection." 3
Since the burden is upon the State not only to establish by expert
testimony that the radar speedmeter is a proper device for measuring
speed, but also that the instrument in question was accurately function-
ing at the time of arrest, it is essential that the testimony of these officers
be removed from the realm of hearsay evidence so as to be properly in-
troduced in the State's case. The New Jersey Court pointed out that
each officer testified to what he in turn observed during the test of the
radar speedmeter to establish the fact that the device was properly
functioning at the time of arrest. Neither officer need testify as to the
radio communication carried on during the test to establish what took
place. Each officer was subject to cross examination on his particular
observance. The New Jersey decision is further distinguished from the
New York decision in that the officers using radar on the New Jersey
Turnpike not only rely on their visual reading of the meter at the time
of the check test, but they also use a graph machine attachment which
registers the speed of the auto passing through the radar beam on paper.
The officer in the radar car then notes in writing, alongside the graph
reading, a description of the auto going through the radar beam at that
time. This graph reading is submitted in evidence to substantiate the
speeding proof. This same type of graph reading may be submitted to
establish the accuracy of the radar speedmeter before it is put into use.
Thus. an officer testifies as to the speed his car was traveling when he
passed through the radar beam, and the officer in the radar car testifies
as to the speed the radar speedmeter indicated when the pickup car
went through the beam; in addition, a graph written recording of the
speedmeter's reading is introduced into evidence. In this way there is
both oral and written evidence to establish the accuracy of the machine
at the time of use and the speed of the driver at the time of the vio-
lation.4
The New York Court, in holding contrary to the present case, in-
dicated that a contrary ruling on the evidence might have been had if
the written record of the test had been offered and introduced into
evidence.
radio relays the speed of the pickup car as registered on the radar speedmeter
to the officer in the pickup car.
3 People v. Offerman, 204 Misc. 769, 125 N.Y.S.2d 182 (1953).
4 31 N.J. Super. 105, 105 A.2d 918 (1954).
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"Although the people claim that a record was made at the time of
these transactions, no such record was offered in evidence, as
provided by 374-A of the Civil Practice Act."5
Hearsay evidence has been defined as:
"evidence which derives its value, not solely from the credit to be
given to the witness upon the stand, but in part from the veracity
and competency of some other person."
The primary reason for the rule against hearsay evidence might
properly be summed up by saying the declarant is not on the witness
stand and hence not subject to cross examination. Applying this rule
and its reason to the New York decision it seems obvious that to ques-
tion one officer about what another officer told him falls clearly within
the realm of hearsay. However, this hearsay evidence is eliminated in
the New Jersey decision where each officer is asked to testify with re-
gard to what he observed at the time of the test of the radar in his in-
dividual function. These officers are not relating what they were told
by each other, and each officer is subject to cross examination on his
particular testimony. It would seem that this independent testimony of
each officer, supplemented by written records of the tests of the speed-
meter and of the violation, would constitute proper evidence of the
speeding violation without a violation of evidence rules.
The New Jersey decision held that the State had satisfied the burden
of proof necessary to substantiate the charge of speeding by allowing
the radar speedmeter readings and testimony into evidence. However,
the New York Court recommended in their decision, and the New
Jersey Court adopted this recommendation in their decision, that
"The legislature in its wisdom might see fit to declare that the
reading of an electrical timing device similar to the one here may
be admitted in evidence as prima facie evidence of the speed of
the automobile of an accused, after such device has been certified
as accurate by the authority designated by the legislature. By
such legislation the people will be relieved of the burden of prov-
ing the accuracy of the electrical timing device upon each trial by
expert testimony. The traveling public will be protected against
convictions based upon the reading of an unproven and possibly
inaccurate device, and of equal importance, the rules of evidence
will not be violated."
Since the use of radar has been accepted in scientific fields for other
purposes than speed detection of vehicles, it is now a question whether
or not this speedmeter is acceptable to the scientific fields as sufficiently
accurate to serve such a purpose. The courts have held that when an
instrument is recognized in scientific fields as acceptable and can be
shown by tests to be reliable, it will be judicially acceptable. The New
5 204 Misc. 769, 125 N.Y.S. 2d 179 (1953).
6 20 Am. JUR., Evidence §451, p. 400.
7Supra, notes 4 and 5.
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Jersey decision with its proper expert testimony and sufficient evidence
properly submitted on the tests of the device is an indication that the
courts are ready to accept it."
There as yet has been no appeal taken to the Wisconsin Supreme
Court on the use of a radar speedmeter in the case of a speeding vio-
lation on Wisconsin highways. One case at the trial court level has been
decided in which the defendant was convicted as charged through use
of the device in question? In that case the State procured an expert
witness who testified regarding the principle and accuracy of the radar
device, and officers were permitted to testify regarding their testing of
the device over the hearsay objection of the defendant. The court held
that it was satisfied by the expert testimony that the radar speedmeter
was a proper device to record speed, and that since both officers were
present to testify to the test of the speedmeter and were subject to
cross examination, their testimony was not hearsay. The officers in this
case submitted in evidence the written records of the speeding violation
made at the scene of the violation. At the present time the burden rests
with the State, at each trial, to establish the acceptability of the radar
speedmeter as a proper instrument to measure speed and its accuracy as
of the time of the arrest.'0 This will continue to involve "lengthy
litigation and appeals.""
Perhaps the legislature will come to the assistance of the prosecution
in establishing the scientific worth of this device. As to the objection
on the ground of hearsay evidence used to prove the State's case, it
would appear that the New Jersey decision has pointed out the methods
of its avoidance; this objection should present little difficulty where
there is offered in evidence testimony by each officer as to his inde-
pendant observations while testing the device and at the time of arrest,
along with written records of the accuracy of the speedmeter at the
time of test and arrest.
THOMAS A. SAVIGNAC
Federal Criminal Procedure-"Plain Error" in Instructions-
Defendants were convicted of conspiring to defraud the United States
by obstructing the Bureau of Internal Revenue in its assessment and
collection of taxes. Defendant Benater assigned as error the refusal of
the district court to give an instruction requested by defendants to the
effect that the alleged conspiracy, so far as defendant Benater was con-
s See Rooney, Admissibility of Radar Speedmeter Readings, 28 TUL. L.REv. 398-
400 (1954).
9 State v. Leuch, District Court of Milwaukee County, No. 50971, February 3,
1954, Judge Gregorski, presiding. However, this decision was reversed on the
facts by a jury on appeal to the Circuit Court of Milwaukee County, No. 1763.
10 Supra, note 5.
11 Supra, note 4.
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